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Discussions of security challenges to Myanmar’s past governments have 
tended to focus on land-based threats, primarily insurgencies associated with 
ethnic armed organizations.1 This does not mean, though, that Myanmar is 
unconcerned about questions of maritime security. This is underscored for 
instance by the expansion of Myanmar’s Navy (Tatmadaw Yay) since the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council came to power in 1988.2 Indeed, 
maritime security issues and challenges have come to increasingly preoccupy 
Myanmar’s recent governments: both military and nominally civilian. At 
stake is not so much the South China Sea, although Myanmar shares the 
interest of other member states of ASEAN in freedom of navigation, but its 
own maritime boundaries and jurisdiction in the Bay of Bengal and the 
Andaman Sea. What instruments has Myanmar relied on to address maritime 
security issues and challenges? What are the interests that Myanmar has been 
seeking to protect? In what ways is Myanmar already involved in more than 
just unilateral measures in the area of maritime security? This brief analysis 
is divided into two parts: first, it examines Naypyidaw’s position on the 
South China Sea conflict. In this regard, particular attention is paid to its 
management of the issue when it held the ASEAN chairmanship in 2014. The 
focus then turns to management of its various maritime interests closer to 
home, including the delineation of maritime boundaries, baseline claims, and 
non-traditional challenges. 
  
Myanmar and the South China Sea 
Myanmar has land boundaries with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and 
Thailand. Only to the south does it open up to the Bay of Bengal and the 
Andaman Sea. Accordingly, unlike several fellow members of ASEAN, 
Myanmar is not a claimant in the South China Sea conflict. But Myanmar 
does have an interest in secure sea lines of communication connecting East 
Asia and the Indian Ocean, including those that pass through the South China 
Sea and the Strait of Malacca. This is particularly true now that Western 
trade and investment sanctions against the country have mostly been lifted 
and trade flows with regional countries in Southeast Asia, Japan, and the 
United States are rising. 
  
As a member of ASEAN since 1997, Myanmar has on a routine basis quietly 
subscribed to and supported the consensus positions on the South China Sea 
forged by the association. This also applies to the diplomatic efforts that 
resulted in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, signed by ASEAN and China. Even when Myanmar could be seen to 
have opted for limited alignment with China in order to deal with 
Washington’s regime change challenge during the years of the George W. 
Bush administration, Myanmar did not visibly undermine ASEAN’s joint 
principled position on the South China Sea. At the same time, Myanmar has 
not taken a position on the sovereignty and maritime claims put forward. This 
should not come as a surprise as Myanmar has traditionally been committed 
to neutrality in its foreign policy. Under U Thein Sein, Myanmar has re-
embraced also in practice the declaratory principle of non-alignment and 
remained committed to an independent and active foreign policy.  
  
How then did Myanmar react to the row that prevented ASEAN from failing 
to issue a joint communique at the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting 
(AMM) when Cambodia was the ASEAN chairman? At the time, the Hun Sen 
government was opposed to incorporating into the communique the draft text 
relating to the South China Sea—put forward by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam—that made reference to the 2012 Scarborough 
Shoal confrontation between China and the Philippines as well as to waters 
Vietnam considers part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but for which 
the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) had issued 
exploration block tenders. Phnom Penh also rejected all relevant draft 
amendments, leading observers to conclude that China was exercising its 
influence with the Hun Sen regime. Interestingly, Myanmar apparently did 
not speak out against even the initial 2012 draft text containing the references 
deemed most sensitive.3 Such a position could primarily have been the 
consequence of the country’s commitment to stay neutral and not to become 
involved; alternatively, the Thein Sein government could have concluded that 
it should stay quiet despite or because of its own more critical attitudes 
toward China. Further research will tell. What is clear, however, is that when 
Myanmar assumed the ASEAN chairmanship in 2014, silence on the South 
China Sea conflict was certainly not an option. After all, the chair is 
responsible for the statements the association releases on the occasion of the 
two annual summit meetings as well as the yearly AMM and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting. 
  
Myanmar as ASEAN Chair 
Pointing to Naypyidaw’s “special” (Pauk-Phaw) relationship with China and 
its status in ASEAN, Myanmar observers predicted that Naypyidaw would 
approach the South China Sea dispute “in an unbiased manner.”4 Indeed, 
notwithstanding the fact that bilateral ties with Beijing had deteriorated over 
several issues in the initial years of the U Thein Sein presidency, in taking 
over the chairmanship Myanmar assumed the role as a neutral. The 
government even seemed optimistic about claimants being able to make 
further progress on the Code of Conduct (CoC) during its chairmanship. This 
apparent optimism built in part on the limited progress achieved under the 
chairmanship of Brunei in so far as China and the ASEAN countries had 
finally agreed to start discussions on the CoC. However, trust building among 
the key claimants was considered crucial for further progress in the ASEAN-
China talks. 
  
During Myanmar’s chairmanship, it was soon tested as a crisis manager. In 
early May 2014, an oilrig owned by the CNOOC was moved into contested 
waters near the Paracel Islands. This prompted a storm of nationalist outrage 
not only in Vietnam, where violent protests targeted Chinese economic 
interests, but also across the wider region about China’s “new assertiveness.” 
Under Myanmar’s stewardship, ASEAN basically reaffirmed the line that the 
grouping finds unacceptable any proprietary behavior by China. Expressing 
“serious concerns” about developments in the chairman’s statement at the 
twenty-fourth summit in May 2014, ASEAN reiterated its basic position that 
freedom of navigation and over flight needed to be maintained and called, 
among other things, for all parties to the DOC to undertake full and effective 
implementation, and to exercise self-restraint. In addition, ASEAN foreign 
ministers released a statement in which they expressed not only their “serious 
concerns over the ongoing developments in the South China Sea,” but also 
expressly argued that these “have increased tensions in the area.” 5 This 
separate statement avoided finger-pointing but, arguably, accommodated 
slightly sharper language than usual—in China’s direction. The rig was 
subsequently withdrawn early. Despite having reportedly been pressed by 
President Xi Jinping on the South China Sea issue, 6 Myanmar continued to 
maintain good balance in further releases, accommodating all sides to some 
extent. The joint communique released at the AMM 2014 for instance did not 
support but “noted” Manila’s “Triple Action Plan” (TAP) that had called for 
an immediate moratorium on specific activities such as land 
reclamations.7 The chairman’s statement at ARF only stressed the need for a 
peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance with universally recognized 
international law,8 and, observers suggested, did not quite reflect 
participants’ heated discussion.9 The chairman’s statement released by 
Naypyidaw on the occasion of the twenty-fifth ASEAN Summit simply 
restated the members’ concern over the situation in the South China Sea, 
without further elaboration. In short, Myanmar did much better than 
Cambodia in responding to the grievances of ASEAN claimants and 
maintaining ASEAN unity while not overplaying their hand vis-à-vis Beijing. 
Consequently, assessments of Myanmar’s role as chairman have been 
positive, both within the country and outside. 
  
Myanmar’s Maritime Security Concerns 
If Myanmar has maintained a neutral and balanced position when addressing 
disputes in which Naypyidaw is not directly involved, how has the country 
dealt with its own maritime security challenges? These have related to a 
combination of maritime boundary disputes, contested baselines and 
operational assertion, as well as non-traditional challenges, such as illegal 
fishing. These challenges are all linked to Myanmar’s geography, not least its 
extensive coastline. 
  
Measured from the mouth of the Naaf River on the border with Bangladesh to 
Kawthaung, the border crossing from Thailand, the Myanmar coastline has a 
total length of 2,228 kilometers. The Rakhine coastline measures 713 
kilometers, the Ayeyarwaddy Delta coastline 437 kilometers, and the 
Tanintharyi coastline 1,078 kilometers. Myanmar’s waters also comprise 852 
islands of various sizes.10 These are distributed in the Bay of Bengal, mostly 
off the Rakhine coast, south of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta, and form the Myeik 
archipelago off the Tanintharyi coast. In addition, Myanmar also has 
sovereignty over the Coco islands that geographically form part of the 
Andaman and Nicobar islands archipelago. In the 1990s, Great Coco Island 
was rumored, especially by Indian analysts, to host a Chinese-run signal 
intelligence gathering station that was monitoring Indian naval activity in the 
Andaman Sea/Indian Ocean. Despite repeated denials, these rumors were 
dispelled only in 2005 by India’s then chief of naval staff. 11 (Notably, India 
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Maritime Disputes 
Myanmar has maritime boundaries with India, Bangladesh, and Thailand. 
The maritime boundary with India was settled already in the 1980s as was, 
for the most part, the maritime boundary between Thailand and Myanmar. In 
the latter case, a dispute has, however, continued regarding the ownership of 
three small islets (Ginga Island/Ko Lam, Ko Khan Island and Ko Ki Nu), 
which has on occasion sparked the occasional naval confrontation. That said, 
the broader significance of this issue seems limited. The key issue for 
Myanmar until the late 2000s, therefore, was the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary between Myanmar and Bangladesh, which, in the words of Dr. 
Aung Myoe, had “the potential to escalate into a major armed conflict.” 12 The 
two countries had negotiated at a political and technical level between 1974 
and 1986 and while having provisionally agreed on a territorial sea boundary 
in 1974, they had failed to delimit their respective EEZ boundary. A key 
question was whether in setting their maritime boundary the principle of 
equidistance should be favored, as argued by Myanmar, over the principle of 
equality, as favored by Bangladesh. No negotiations on the maritime 
boundary had taken place between 1986 and March 2008. But in 2008, Dhaka 
formulated a new maritime claim that from Myanmar’s perspective was “far 
more aggressive.”13 Against this backdrop, a naval standoff occurred in 
November 2008 after Myanmar engaged in exploration activities in a 
disputed area supposedly rich in gas deposits. 14 With bilateral diplomacy 
proving fruitless to find a mutually acceptable resolution, Bangladesh took 
the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 
October 2009 to secure the delimitation of the maritime boundaries with 
Myanmar in relation to the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and 
continental shelf.  Myanmar accepted the jurisdiction of ITLOS. 
  
Initial deliberations concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary 
began in early September 2011, and 15 public sittings were organized the 
same month. Bangladesh insisted that the maritime boundary in relation to 
the territorial sea should be the agreed line in 1974, which, it argued, had 
been reaffirmed in 2008. However, Myanmar denied that the territorial sea 
boundary had been settled conclusively. The tribunal decided to reject 
Bangladesh’s line of argumentation. It accepted instead Myanmar’s claim 
that the “1974 Agreement” was not legally binding because it was 
conditional on an agreement to delimit all contested waters. The tribunal also 
ruled that there was no tacit or de facto agreement as regards the delimitation 
of the territorial sea. It also did not uphold the estoppel claim put forward by 
Bangladesh as there was no indication that Myanmar had caused Bangladesh 
to change its position to its detriment. At the same time, the tribunal agreed 
with Bangladesh’s claim that St. Martin’s Island, which lies in the 
northeastern part of the Bay of Bengal about 8 kilometers west of the 
northwest coast of Myanmar, should have a 12 nautical mile territorial sea in 
the area where the territorial sea of Bangladesh no longer overlaps with 
Myanmar’s territorial sea. Bangladesh committed to respecting access for 
Myanmar around St Martin’s to the Naaf River.  
  
With respect to the EEZ and the continental shelf, the tribunal decided that 
there be a single delimitation line for both. Again differences existed on the 
method: whereas Bangladesh strongly argued that the equidistance line was 
inequitable and therefore favored the “angle-bisector method,” Myanmar 
rejected the latter. 
  
Map 2. 
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The tribunal decided to apply the equidistance/relevant circumstances method 
that in effect made for an adjusted equidistant line. St. Martin’s Island was 
not given any effect in drawing the delimitation line of the EEZ and 
continental shelf.15 This was also applied for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, where coastal states have 
sovereign rights to resources on the seabed and its subsoil. Both Bangladesh 
and Myanmar had for different reasons maintained that the other state had no 
entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In coming up 
with its decision, the tribunal felt that the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries was without prejudice as regards to the exercise of delineating the 
outer limits of the continental shelf. Both Myanmar and Bangladesh accepted 
the tribunal’s decision.16 The ruling marked a victory for diplomacy and 
international adjudication. After its submission in December 2008, 
Naypyidaw submitted an amendment in July 2015. 
  
Contested Maritime Claims and Operational Assertions 
A very different kind of security concern for Myanmar has been a 
consequence of what the United States takes to be excessive maritime claims. 
At issue is a challenge by the United States to Myanmar’s straight baselines, 
particularly as concerns the Gulf of Martaban, but also other maritime 
claims, such as restrictions Myanmar has imposed in relation to its claimed 
EEZ. In practice, this challenge involves US policy to operationally assert 
freedom of navigation against countries that are perceived to put forward 
excessive maritime claims, which encompasses the regular violation of these 
excessive maritime claims by US naval assets.17 
  
In Myanmar’s case, it was in November 1968 that the chairman of the 
Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, General Ne Win, declared the 
boundary of the country’s territorial sea. In this context, the military 
government issued its baseline claim “by reason of the geographical 
conditions prevailing on the Union of Burma coasts, and for the purpose of 
safeguarding the vital economic interest of the inhabitants of the coastal 
regions.”18 Specifically, it drew 21 straight baseline segments, from the 
southern point of Mayu Island on the Rakhine Coast to the western point of 
Murray island on Thanintharyi coast. Significantly, this included a massive 
single baseline segment across the Gulf of Martaban, which has a length of 
more than 220 nautical miles between Alguada Reef (Pathein Light) and 
Western Point of Long Island (see Figure 4), making for one of the longest 
straight baseline claims in the world. The effect was that the distance thus 
created between land and the baseline was as much as approximately 130 
nautical miles. 
  
Map 3. Straight Baseline Gulf of Martaban 
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Though justified by Myanmar with reference to the vital economic interests 
of the inhabitants of the coastal region,19 Washington has considered the 
claim to be excessive and, hence, openly challenged it. While recognizing 
that straight baselines are permissible where the coastline is deeply indented 
or cut into (see Art. 7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)), it has argued that Myanmar’s straight baselines “depart to an 
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast of Burma and 
[that], therefore, the system does not comport with international 
law.”20 Moreover, Washington also justified its protest as follows: 
“Burma…by drawing a 222-mile straight baseline across the Gulf of 
Martaban has claimed about 14,300 square kilometers (an area similar in size 
to Denmark) as internal waters which, absent the closing line, would be 
territorial sea or high seas.”21 Myanmar is, for sure, not the only country in 
relation to which Washington argues there is a case of excessive maritime 
claims, not even in Southeast Asia.22 But as in other cases, Washington has 
been opposed to what it considers to be an objectionable claim to restrict 
rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over 
flight and other related high seas uses. Consequently, it has also declared the 
right of operational assertion in the case of the straight baselines across the  
Gulf of Martaban. The first of multiple assertions of rights occurred in 1985. 
Operational assertions against Myanmar have continued regularly; some have 
also been directed at requirements related to Myanmar’s EEZ. According to 
public records made available by the US Department of Defense, the last 
publicized operational assertion occurred between October 2010 and 
September 2011. It is clear that before President Obama in 2009 refocused 
US Burma policy from forcing regime change to encouraging regime 
transition, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) would have 
been quite concerned about American operational assertions. Even if 
overblown, anxiety among Myanmar’s military planners about possible US 
military intervention seems to have been a constant feature. After all, such 
concerns seem to have played a role in the SPDC’s decision to reject 
Washington’s proposal to deliver humanitarian supplies by US naval vessels 
in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.23 While the fear factor of the past will no 
longer be as substantial at a time when Myanmar and the United States stand 
to strengthen their emerging partnership, it probably should not be assumed 
that Naypyidaw would these days be unconcerned about deliberate US 
assertions directed at its maritime claims. 
  
Hydrocarbon Deposits in Myanmar’s EEZ 
As the aforementioned 2008 naval standoff between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar indicated, both countries are eager to exploit known and presumed 
offshore energy reserves. In this regard, Myanmar has for long been 
dependent on foreign know-how and capacity. Well before independence was 
achieved, foreign companies already drilled in Myanmar (e.g., Burmah Oil 
Company (BOC); American Standard Oil Company). Following the 
nationalization of the industry in the 1960s, the SPDC kick-started it anew 
from 1988. Since then, although production remains limited, the increasing 
export of gas from major offshore fields has boosted coffers. Foreign direct 
investment in oil and gas exploration and production, of course, proved very 
controversial during the SPDC years given that gas exports in particular were 
seen by many, especially within the international non-governmental (INGO) 
community, as supporting military rule while the building of related 
infrastructure was linked to human rights abuses. Thailand has been drawing 
heavily on existing production as underscored by existing Myanmar gas 
exports from the Yadana and Yetagun fields. With the Zawtika gas field, the 
largest offshore field to be operated by PTTEP (Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand Exploration and Production), coming on stream, a reported 25 
percent of Thailand’s annual gas consumption will be sourced from 
neighboring Myanmar. Since mid-2013, Myanmar has also exported gas to 
China from the Shwe gas fields off the Rakhine coast. To date, these natural 
gas exports have been about one-third of those to Thailand.24 
  
Map 4. Myanmar’s EEZ 
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Following the establishment of the nominally civilian government under 
Thein Sein, international interest in investments in Myanmar’s oil and gas 
industry has markedly risen. In June 2014, for instance, the Myanmar 
government awarded 20 international companies preliminary rights to 
explore. The offshore blocks comprise both deep-water ones and shallow-
water ones. Myanmar has significant known deposits. However, unproven 
reserves are considered to be much, much higher. Myanmar’s government, 
given the country’s status as a net energy importer, is also keen for energy 
reserves to be developed and put to use for a growing domestic economy. 
Indeed, Myanmar’s transitional government listed the development of the 
energy and mining sectors as among the top seven priorities for achieving a 
target 8 percent annual increase in GDP. Investment in the oil and gas sector 
reportedly stood at USD 14.3 billion by the end of the third quarter of 
2014/2015. According to a McKinsey report, the contribution of the energy 
and mining sector is projected to expand to USD 21.7 billion of Myanmar’s 
GDP by 2030.25 With the maritime boundary with Bangladesh now settled, 
the focus is on protecting the security of existing and future investments. 
  
Map 5: Myanmar’s Oil and Gas Blocks 
 
 Image removed due to third party copyright, consult published version 
Nontraditional Maritime Security Issues 
Myanmar is also concerned about some non-traditional security challenges in 
its maritime environment. One relates to the apparent rapid depletion of fish 
stocks, which is linked to a combination of overfishing and illegal fishing. In 
this regard, the activities of Thai fishing companies, who already by the late 
1980s were keen on acquiring licenses from SPDC-run Myanmar following 
the significant exhaustion of Thai marine resources, have been under 
particular scrutiny. Hundreds of foreign owned offshore fishing vessels seem 
to have compounded the issue of overfishing in Myanmar’s EEZ.26 But Thai 
companies were also allowed to fish in Myanmar territorial waters for 
relatively little compensation.27Under the nominally civilian government, 
Myanmar has apparently discontinued some agreements over fishing rights 
for Thai boats. Myanmar’s fishermen have also received a boost by virtue of 
efforts by the current Thai military government to clean up that country’s 
fishery industry. Other factors have also been contributing to greater 
earnings, including the global decrease in fuel costs and the depreciation of 
the Myanmar currency, the kyat. As a consequence of these factors, the value 
of fisheries exports has reportedly risen from USD 40 million in 2003 to 
USD 144 million in 2014.28 The protection of Myanmar’s delineated maritime 
space is thus perhaps more important than ever. 
  
Incidents of piracy and armed robbery have at times been a source of serious 
concern for some Southeast Asian governments. In recent years, such 
incidents have affected numerous vessels in the Bay of Bengal.   Although 
most reported crimes refer to petty theft and robbery, mostly when ships are 
at anchor off Bangladeshi ports (see Table 1), some incidents have also 
occurred around Myanmar, often involving Singapore-flagged tugboats. 
Three such incidents occurred in the Bay of Bengal in 2010, one in 2011, and 
two in 2014. In the Andaman Sea, the last reported incident happened in 
2010, involving a robbery on a Singapore flagged LPG-tanker. In marked 
contrast to Bangladesh, very few reported robberies have taken place  with 
ships at anchor (see Table 2). Though numbers are relatively low, dealing 
effectively with piracy and armed robbery is a concern for Myanmar’s 
authorities. 
  






2007 12 1 13 
2008 11 1 12 
2009 18 1 19 
2010 24 0 24 
2011 14 0 14 
2012 11 0 11 
2013 6 0 6 
2014 10 1 11 
2015 10 0 10 
Total 116 4 120 
Source: ReCAAP-consolidated incidents reports, see (recaap.org) 
  











2007 1 0 0 0 1 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 1 0 1 
2010 3 1 0 0 4 
2011 1 0 1 0 2 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 2 0 0 0 2 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7 1 2 0 10 
Source: ReCAAP-consolidated incidents reports, see (recaap.org) 
  
Naval Modernization and Cooperation 
The lessons learned from the 2008 naval standoff with Bangladesh and the 
appreciation of the diverse nature of challenges to its maritime interests seem 
to have been key factors in prompting Myanmar to strengthen its own naval 
capabilities.29 A program of indigenously built frigates, which benefit also 
from foreign systems, has been the result. Following the commissioning in 
2010 of the Aung Zeya, the lead ship in this class, Myanmar acquired two 
former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Jianghu I class frigates, 
apparently as a stop-gap measure, before other indigenously built frigates 
would follow.30 In 2014, Myanmar’s navy, thus, commissioned the  Kyan Sit 
Thar, and within days launched yet another frigate (Sin Phyu Shin), the third 
of reportedly six frigates that Naypyidaw is eager to build. There are also 
reported discussions with China and Russia concerning the possible 
acquisition of submarines. 
  
Myanmar is promising to become more active as regards bilateral and 
multilateral naval cooperation. For some years, it had participated in the 
biannual MILAN (Meeting of the Littorals of Bay of Bengal, Andaman, and 
Nicobar) exchanges and exercises, but in 2013 Myanmar’s navy also 
embarked on a port call to the Indian mainland, involving a frigate and a 
corvette for bilateral exercises and patrolling in the southern Bay of Bengal. 
More recently, Malaysia has invited Myanmar to become an observer of the 
Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) initiative to combat piracy. This initiative was 
formed in 2006; it comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, Eyes in the Sky, 
and the MSP Intelligence Exchange Group. Over the longer term, Myanmar’s 
navy, thus, also stands to become more integrated in collaborative efforts to 
address wider maritime security challenges. 
  
Conclusion 
Myanmar has had a range of maritime security issues to deal with over the 
years. Where it has not been directly involved as a claimant, Naypyidaw has 
sought to maintain a neutral and balanced stance, as illustrated with respect 
to the South China Sea: a neutral position on sovereignty claims, and a 
balanced diplomatic stance toward the claimants. Where Myanmar has been 
directly involved in maritime disputes, it has used bilateral diplomacy in the 
first instance to achieve a settlement. However, against the backdrop of a 
failure to agree with Bangladesh on the delimitation of their maritime 
boundary, Myanmar agreed to adjudication. ITLOS did not accept the full 
extent of Myanmar’s claim, but the advantage of having pursued dispute 
settlement in this manner is that Naypyidaw can take economic advantage of 
now having a clearly delimited EEZ. This is particularly important given that 
Myanmar relies on foreign technical expertise for both the exploration and 
production of its energy reserves. Notably, Myanmar also appreciates that the 
protection of its EEZ requires investment in naval assets. Over time 
Myanmar’s navy, thus, may yet play a more active role in addressing 
maritime security challenges and, perhaps, also become more involved in 
relevant regional cooperation. 
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